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Abstract: In his article, "Living Together as an Intercultural Task," Roland Hagenbüchle explores 
the multi-faceted challenges we face in a multicultural world. At the same time, he refers the 
reader to a survey of recent studies indispensable to an informed investigation of this topic. After 
analyzing the various options for coming to terms with life in multicultural societies and paying 
special attention to John Rawls' global model of justice as fairness and Martha C. Nussbaum's con-
cept of a good life (based on the capability model), Hagenbüchle advances the transcultural con-
cept of personhood as a non-hegemonic starting point for a dialogic intercultural exchange. Sur-
prisingly enough, the correspondences of values among otherwise widely differing cultures tend to 
converge in the form of a common human ethos, thus strengthening our trust in a peaceful coex-
istence of peoples and (hopefully) laying to rest the ghosts of an inevitable and close-to-
apocalyptic "clash of civilizations" (Huntington).  
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Living Together as an Intercultural Task  
 
Negotiating the coexistence of diverse cultures, ethnic groups, races, and religions has become 
one of the most urgent challenges at the beginning of this new century. Should this issue remain 
unresolved, smoldering and open conflicts in the political as well as the private sphere will be inev-
itable. While intraculturalism, demographically speaking, has already become a reality in many 
countries, a relatively large number of thinkers, politicians, etc., doubt the desirability of 
interculturalism. If, as is argued by cultural relativists, each culture maintains its own value sys-
tem -- and that it cannot adequately be understood from an external perspective -- then all cul-
tures, like religions, can equally claim the right to acknowledgement and to the inviolability of their 
respective identities. The right to be different is elevated to the status of principle. Equality be-
comes a matter of equal value, which renders any critique of cultural norms impossible, resulting 
in what Melford E. Spiro calls "moral cultural relativism," a concept which Richard Rorty has criti-
cized from an epistemological point of view (159). Pure heterogeneity, which, according to 
Lyotard, constitutes the hallmark of postmodernism, would thus also characterize the relationship 
between cultures. Intercultural communication would consequently be detrimental (see Abou 
1995, 93; Abou 1986, 47-82).  
From a relativistic perspective, any form of acculturation is neo-colonial in nature, resulting 
in "ethnocide" or "deculturation." The loss of one's own culture and accepted value system must -- 
unless replaced by another -- lead to the dissolution of one's own traditional social order. As prov-
en by military upheavals in different cultural regions, such apprehensions are not unfounded. Eth-
nologists such as Lévy-Strauss therefore advocate a careful negotiation of intercultural relations -- 
and this does not refer to "exotic" cultures alone (qtd. in Abou 1995, 27; see also Kuper 243). 
Paradoxically speaking, the attempt to understand the Other, as Barbara Whitmer has recently 
demonstrated, often has the opposite effect of creating mutual hostility. Bassam Tibi, for example, 
laconically states that people are more likely to wage war on neighboring countries than on distant 
ones. Gregory Bateson and Jürgen Rüesch point out that people who have different but comple-
mentary "universes" are able to cooperate successfully even without understanding the other's 
universe -- in fact, any efforts to this effect may even result in a failure of communication 
(Bateson and Rüesch 234-35). And Martin Buber views Urdistanzierung as a central prerequisite 
for any relationship since one can only enter into a relationship with a distant Other (i.e., an Other 
recognized as separate from oneself) (Buber 412-16). As a result, Tzvetan Todorov regards modes 
of communication without sufficient distance between dialogue partners as damaging since they 
tend to homogenize cultural diversity. According to Todorov, the homogenization of cultures, cur-
rently heightened by the developments of mass culture and global commerce, results in nothing 
less than a death sentence for humankind (qtd. in Abou 1995, 28). For the most part agreeing 
with this pessimistic conclusion, Ninian Smart cautions against "bulldozing" individual cultures in 
the midst of our current euphoria over globalization (372; see also Clifford 36-37, 45-46). In T.S. 
Eliot's words: "'a world culture ... would be no culture at all. We should have a humanity 
dehumanized'" (qtd. in Kuper 38-39).  
Despite our substantial efforts to safeguard the variety of species we are not doing enough 
to safeguard the variety of cultures. Christopher Bliss, for example, criticizes the World Bank for 
not sufficiently considering the destructive effects of their actions on existing lifestyles in develop-
ing countries (Bliss 431-32). The loss of this cultural variety would rob us of the opportunity to 
learn more about ourselves and to critically rethink our own cultural paradigms through inter-
cultural comparisons (see Smart 371). Establishing an identity of their own no doubt still has prior-
ity for hitherto marginalized and developing countries. The movement of Négritude (criticized by 
Fanon and others as a product of Western thought) presents an instructive example. Curiously 
enough, the West itself rejects ethnocentrism while encouraging it in non-Western cultures -- 
probably owing to a sense of guilt -- without considering the long-term consequences (Abou 1995, 
28).  
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Selim Abou and others have pointed out that productive intercultural relations can only be 
formed with the help of a universally valid normative order (Abou 1995, 29, 79-80, 83-85). Even 
"freedom" -- the basis and prerequisite of all other values -- loses its meaning without a normative 
horizon of values (Woody 301). Strict relativists, however, reject such an approach as essentialist 
-- yet this would also invalidate the basis for human rights. Furthermore, as James Clifford states, 
even anti-identity discourses cannot do without terms like "culture" and "identity." Yet there have 
been recent attempts to abandon the concept of culture altogether. Even though Clifford himself 
insists on preserving the idea of culture and its differentiating function, he, like Homi Bhabha, 
strives for a "hybrid collective identity" -- without, however, testing its viability (182).  
Walter Benn Michaels's Our America has recently complicated this discussion by equating 
factually "culture" with "racism": "The modern concept of culture is not ... a critique of racism, it is 
a form of racism" and again: "Without racial identity, there is no cultural identity" (qtd. in Kuper 
240-41; see also Hall 89-136). Within Michaels's "negative dialectic," even anti-racism becomes 
racism. Yet Michaels fails to consider the highly destructive cultural consequences of racist ideolo-
gies. The reason for such a reversal of values is obvious. For Michaels, there exists no normative 
horizon upon which values can be based. Without such a basis, however, dialectical thinking inevi-
tably slides into an infinite regression. Yet it not only constitutes faulty dialectics, it is also politi-
cally irresponsible to operate with "inverse racism." Michaels could have learned from Lévy-Strauss 
that someone can only be criticized as a "barbarian" (or "racist") if he or she believes in "barbari-
anism" (or "racism") and behaves accordingly (qtd. in Kuper 243). Bassam Tibi rightly cautions 
against discrediting the advocacy of cultural norms as cultural imperialism or racism (Tibi 8). And 
Clifford agrees: "there is no reason to assume that crossover practices [or hybrid identities] are 
always liberatory or ... that an autonomous identity or national culture is always reactionary" (10).  
The Problematics of Multiculturalism 
In the wake of migrations owing to economic or political reasons, even European societies have 
turned multicultural during the past few decades. Today, most countries exhibit a multicultural 
demographic make-up. People of diverse cultural, national, ethnic, racial, and religious back-
grounds live -- more or less peacefully -- together (the Balkan states constitute an unfortunate 
exception on the old continent). Yet the number of immigrants admitted by different European 
countries varies widely. Except for Switzerland, Germany has accepted the highest number of im-
migrants in relation to its overall population whereas France, Great Britain, Ireland, and Italy (the 
last two are countries whose number of emigrants is one of the highest in the world) practice a 
restrictive immigration policy and allow only small numbers of immigrants into their countries. Hol-
land and Finland have almost completely resisted these demographic shifts.  
Multiculturalism in the sense of a multicultural lifestyle, currently propagated as a social 
model, is a construct of Western academic theory, akin to the postmodern "plurality of subjectivi-
ty" (and the "patchwork self"). Enthusiastic postmodernist claims to the contrary, a multicultural 
existence is by no means easy to realize (see Hollinger; Hagenbüchle, "From Common" 71-77). In 
fact, as Samuel P. Huntington observes, it is destructive. If one were to believe Félix Guattari, it 
results in a schizophrenic existence. Whatever position one may take, multiculturalism has already 
become a reality in many ways, a fact requiring a new mode of subjectivity. In "Das Subjekt als 
Grenzgänger" I argue that, under certain conditions, a multicultural existence may not only be 
possible but, as will be the case in the future, necessary. This, however, presupposes a new way of 
thinking and an attitude that we have not practiced enough so far, if at all. In short, multicultural 
societies are characterized by their valorization of a variety of lifestyles, concepts of the world and 
mankind, and their attempts to establish a social order based on "equality," "tolerance," and mu-
tual "respect." Since Charles Taylor's particular blend of Canadian perspectives of multiculturalism, 
"respect" and "tolerance" have been elevated to form the ethical basis of multicultural societies. 
Yet whether a productive foundation has really been gained remains doubtful. We still have to de-
termine, for example, to what extent "tolerance" is a justifiable response to intolerant and aggres-
sive behavior, and in what way "respect" (in the sense of acceptance) can be demanded vis-à-vis a 
social system that fundamentally violates one's own values. In the context of intercultural conflicts 
of values, "tolerance" and "respect," evidently, fail as normative guidelines, both in the public as 
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well as the private sphere. To practice tolerance and respect in a meaningful way requires reci-
procity as well as the development of a shared horizon of values that allows for a precise definition 
and critical assessment of the boundaries of these concepts. In this regard, Taylor still owes us a 
convincing answer (see also Kuper 236-37).  
Tolerance proves to be useless -- in fact highly detrimental -- if merely employed as a po-
litical catchword, a catchword similar to solidarity, which is often conveniently used by politicians 
eager to promote their own agenda by attempting to portray their opponents as "intolerant" and 
"lacking in solidarity." In my opinion, this kind of rhetoric is repulsive in its abuse of elementary 
ethical terms. It is morally altruistic in language, but politically egotistical in action. It is this kind 
of rhetoric that turns into mere slogans the very value systems that should form the ethical basis 
for a peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, the "mediatization" of political culture has reduced politics 
to a public spectacle. There remains little room for a critical discussion that might open up the 
possibility for self-criticism.  
For postmodernists, the concept of culture is an exclusively pluralist one (see Kuper 23-
46; 59-63). Yet the valorization of cultural diversity -- in the sense of a radical equality of all cul-
tures -- prevents any form of critical engagement, thus contradicting the notions of a universally 
valid reason or a binding ethical norm. Even though acknowledging the existence of multicultural 
societies, Mark R. Amstutz therefore strongly rejects "cultural relativism" as an inappropriate and 
ethically unacceptable theory "because it is impossible to live with the doctrine's severe conse-
quences." For Amstutz, as for other critics, relativism is "intellectually indefensible" (Amstutz 1-
12). Attempts to overcome, at least in part, the contradictions inherent in multiculturalism are 
usually based on the principle of human rights, which is deemed indispensable for guaranteeing 
the dignity and self-respect of humankind. At this point, however, the problems start, as there is 
no agreement on these rights' range of validity. They are questioned whenever they are in conflict 
with one's own ethical, religious, or sociocultural value system, or whenever they run counter to a 
government's national self-interests. In such cases, a person's dignity and self-respect is annulled 
without further explanation -- as if the Human Rights Declaration of the UNO never existed. Draw-
ing on numerous examples, Amstutz demonstrates the extent to which the political pursuit of pow-
er and economic egotism have repeatedly undermined ethical principles. The USA is counted 
among the biggest global sinners of this kind, as suggested, for example, by Ahmed Rashid's anal-
ysis of their involvement in the rise of the Taliban.  
Following Marx and Lyotard, Ralf Dahrendorf has identified the agonistic element as the 
determining quality of postmodern society. As numerous warlike disputes demonstrate, this largely 
also applies to the relationship between cultures. Unfortunately, however, this conflict model does 
not take into account a culture's quality -- thus preventing a necessary and fruitful competition 
between diverse cultural forms (Sen 1999, 54-86). Anthony Giddens has highlighted the postmod-
ern tension between tradition and cultural value: "A post-traditional order is not one in which tra-
dition disappears -- far from it ... Traditions have to ... become open to interrogation'" (qtd. in 
Smart 372). Seen from a comparative perspective, two criteria are of special importance: 1) Which 
culture provides better protection for the basic existential needs of human beings (this includes 
John Rawls's "primary goods," such as one's livelihood and security as well as social self-esteem 
[348-52])? and 2) Which culture provides better opportunities to realize the "good life" (Sen's "ca-
pability set" 1999 74-110; see also Nussbaum's discussion of basic necessities and capabilities in 
Gerechtigkeit 187-226)?  
In the West, there exists a strong interest in non-Western -- especially Eastern -- notions 
of spirituality (e.g., Buddhism or Islam). Yet as soon as social interaction interferes with one's in-
dividual private space, the other culture can no longer be accepted as equal. The differences in 
religious and social norms, especially in the context of family structures, seem impossible to over-
come quickly. Even without assuming an explicitly feminist stance, one has to note that the role of 
women inevitably proves to be an interculturally contentious issue, as is the method of child rear-
ing and education. In concrete situations, abstract theories of living together, including the princi-
ples of tolerance and respect, lose their seemingly incontestable validity. To deal with such value 
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conflicts in a peaceful manner requires a transcultural standard for decision making. John Kekes 
has offered some highly relevant suggestions in this context. 
Suggestions for Solutions  
Contrary to Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(1996), a study insistently cautioning against the dangers of intercultural conflict, Bassam Tibi, in 
Der Krieg der Zivilisationen: Zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus (1995), proposes ways to 
bridge cultural gaps without downplaying the differences inherent in different value systems. Hun-
tington's study is based on a political realist's estimate of global spheres of conflict. Tibi, on the 
other hand, employs Kant's principle of reason while at the same time calling for institutional pro-
tection against practices that violate human rights (134-41). His cogently argued book proves to 
be the most balanced discussion of these problems to date. In contrast to Huntington, whose anal-
ysis needs to be understood as provocative warning, Tibi offers concrete suggestions for solving 
intercultural conflicts. His, in the best sense of the word, enlightening and emancipating stance is 
courageous and forward- looking (35-44). Jan and Aleida Assmann's brilliant and original essay in 
Kultur und Konflikt goes in a similar direction. Instead of a "theory of mutual understanding," 
Assmann and Assmann develop a "praxeology of understanding" in the sense of a "mutual ar-
rangement." The Assmanns' studies are indispensable -- as are Tibi's works -- for a deeper under-
standing of cultural processes. Further, Jürgen Habermas's proposal of a non-hegemonic discourse 
as a means to avoid or solve conflicts could very well be a worthwhile basis for intercultural com-
munication. At the same time, it would require a willingness on the part of all participants to ac-
cept the best argument. Yet there are very few examples of solutions accomplished on the basis of 
dialogic argumentation alone, without external institutional pressure. Apart from the fact that the 
achievements of the European Enlightenment have long been lost, as the terrible events of the 
past century have shown, we are far removed from a global Enlightenment. In this context, the 
Habermasean model -- while remaining a respectable outline -- proves impractical in its utopian 
goal. Recently, Otfried Höffe's "Eine föderale Weltrepublik" (1999) presented a detailed proposal 
for a supra-national institution, which deserves attention beyond the discipline of philosophy. The 
fact that, under current political circumstances, this proposal has little chance of being realized, in 
no way diminishes Höffe's contribution.  
In his "Oxford Amnesty Lecture" (1993), entitled "The Law of Peoples," John Rawls sketch-
es a globally acceptable legal basis apt to guarantee a minimum of individual freedom and safety. 
He believes that his project "Justice as Fairness" may be acceptable for non-Western and even 
non-liberal (e.g., theocratically governed) states. In his analysis and evaluation of this suggestion, 
Patrick Hayden comes to the conclusion that, ultimately, Rawls's model is not universally applica-
ble and, even more problematically, that Rawls's treatment of human rights borders on cultural 
relativism (for another critique see also Hoffmann). It is true that Rawls's terms of "freedom" and 
"equality" allow for different meanings in the context of different forms of government and that he 
leaves sociocultural and religious norms untouched even if they violate the "Declaration of Human 
Rights" of 1948. At the same time he insists on a few (in his view) generally acceptable fundamen-
tal rights, so-called "primary" rights or negative freedoms (the right to be free of enslavement, of 
torture, etc.). He excludes, for the most part, the positive freedoms at the core of Human Rights 
(especially Article 1) in order to avoid potential conflicts with non-Western cultural norms or the 
charge of neo-colonialism.  
If measured against practical utility and applied to the current discussion between radical 
proponents of Islam and political reformers intent on improving the position of women in Morocco, 
for example (see Hungtinton 2000, 5), the weaknesses of this model become apparent. Rawls's 
"The Law of Peoples" fails to offer help in two areas: first, with respect to men's infinite possibili-
ties to turn a woman out of their house; and second, with respect to women's financial compensa-
tions for agreeing to a polygamous family life. In fact, the model does not even indicate which di-
rection the position of women in this country (90% of whom are illiterate) might take -- a position 
in dire need of reform from a human rights perspective. Rawls could have heeded Rousseau's sug-
gestion of adapting national laws to common principles of humanity (qtd. in Abou 1995, 43). Yet 
for Rawls, it is the different cultural and political value systems that maintain primary validity. 
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Since human rights have to be adapted to those systems, individual freedoms -- depending on the 
respective culture and type of state -- are substantially restricted. The question then remains 
whether Rawls's pragmatically prompted concession of tolerance toward other cultures is not too 
high a price to pay. 
Although "The Law of Peoples" deserves respect as a first step toward a global legal order, 
the answer must needs be in the affirmative. Rawls's list of negative freedoms would admittedly 
constitute significant progress if implemented, yet deprivileging human rights in favor of tradition-
ally established cultural and political norms would render the latter unamenable to external criti-
cism, thus rendering possible changes unlikely for generations to come. To posit an adaptable, 
changeable legal basis seems to be highly problematic since other cultures are initially excluded 
from contributing to formulate this basis -- despite the possibility of later adjustments. Irrespec-
tive of its ultimate form, a universal legal order should be envisioned as a goal rather than posited 
as a point of departure; that is, we should concentrate on first working out a transcultural under-
standing of legal actions and values in mutual dialogic exchanges (see also Nussbaum 1999, 196, 
240). The idea of a united humanity needs to grow with time; it cannot be decreed (Schleißheimer 
in a personal letter to the author, 22 March 2000; Smart 371-72). Only in the course of a joint 
effort to realize such a project can a feeling of partnership develop.  
Contrary to all objections, human rights still remain an ethically and politically promising 
attempt to acknowledge cultural diversity without simultaneously slipping into a radical relativity of 
norms that would inevitably lead to totalitarianism. The experiences of the last decades vividly 
demonstrate the difficulties involved in practicing human rights; numerous studies on this issue 
have been published. Yet this must not prevent us from promoting fundamental values stemming 
from a developed notion of the human being. This is not a primarily theoretical postulate but an 
eminently practical concern, increasingly shared by developing countries due to their painful expe-
riences whose implications for their own existence, contrary to Lee Kuan Yew's thesis (qtd. in Sen 
1999, 151-52), they certainly understand. Amartya Sen thus strongly contradicts Lee's claims that 
the poor of developing countries show no concern for democracy and human rights (Sen 1999, 
151-52).  
Together with other second nations and developing countries, it is China, in particular, that 
has repeatedly criticized the universal claim to human rights as Eurocentric or Euro-American neo-
imperialist (the issue was raised in the "Bangkok Declaration" and during the succeeding UNO hu-
man-rights conference in Vienna, 1993, in this form [see Davis, "Chinese" 3-24; Loh 145-87]). If 
analyzed closely, especially in the context of the changing policies of various Western govern-
ments, it becomes evident that human rights often constitute an arbitrarily applied instrument of 
political power. It is sad, in fact even tragic, that Europe and the USA are incapable of a political 
action in accordance with their high moral traditions. On the other hand, the second nations' and 
developing countries' reservations indicate that a -- for them -- eminently important issue is being 
thwarted by dictatorial regimes and national self-interests. Wolfgang Schmale has presented a de-
tailed study of these issues in Human Rights and Cultural Diversity (1993).  
These and similar objections raised against human rights do indeed highlight the necessity 
to find a different solution without, however, questioning the principle itself. In Menschenrechte 
und Kulturen (1995), Selim Abou put this very poignantly: "Human beings are not just legal sub-
jects but also beings who demand recognition, acceptance, and love"; in other words, they are 
also "persons" (Abou 1995, 29-34). As shown by my historic-systematic introduction to the two-
volume Geschichte und Vorgeschichte der modernen Subjektivität (1998), it is hardly an exag-
geration to state that the entire Western history of ideas -- from classical antiquity to the present 
times -- amounts to a definition and redefinition of the concept of "personhood"; even postmod-
ernism is no exception (Hagenbüchle Geschichte, 1-80, especially 76-77; see also Hagenbüchle 
"We are All," 1-36). The principle of human rights likewise finds its ultimate justification in the no-
tion of "personhood."  
Agreeing with Amartya K. Sen, and echoing Aristotle, Martha C. Nussbaum proposes a 
"conception of person" grounded in "central human capabilities" (Cultivating 190). While accepting 
the validity of some of Rawls's "primary goods," Nussbaum considers the opportunity to make full 
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individual use of these primary goods -- rather than human rights (as guaranteed by the constitu-
tion) -- as a prerequisite for a "good human life" defined as the opportunity to develop into "full 
personhood." To prevent someone from utilizing these primary goods is tantamount to preventing 
him/her from fully achieving "personhood" and thus disregards human "autonomy, dignity, and 
emotional well being" (Cultivating 204). Nussbaum (following Aristotle) argues empirically, basing 
the validity of her concept of "personhood" on the self-interpretations of different cultures as they 
manifest themselves in "myths and tales." While she tries to initiate a debate on primary experi-
ences and primary capabilities, no decision has yet been reached as to "how [such a debate] will 
use and criticize traditional convictions" and "how it will deal with oppositional convictions" (Culti-
vating 247). 
Still, this capability model remains the most promising approach to a universally ethical 
norm to date. Nussbaum herself has compiled a (provisional) list of fundamental capabilities which 
-- from her point of view -- define "good human life." To guarantee their development is, accord-
ing to Nussbaum, a political duty. It is crucial to note, however, that Nussbaum's normative focus 
on (historically and culturally situated) concrete human experiences -- like Rawls's -- is based on 
abstract (Kantian) principles. In contrast, Amartya K. Sen's use of the capability concept in the 
field of development aid policy (with a special focus on women's quality of life) induced the Human 
Development Reports of the UNO to analyze and categorize nations according to this approach -- a 
rare but well-earned success of theoretical effort.  
Without a doubt, the concept of personhood has been developed most continuously and 
most complexly in Western cultures (see "Person"). Although, as Bernhard Schleißheimer explains, 
this has not resulted in a unified concept of the "person," some significant characteristics were and 
still are fairly generally accepted, including identity, individuality, reason, and freedom and auton-
omy (see Schleißheimer 1987, 482f., and 1989 4f.; Müller and Vossenkuhl 1060). The dual tradi-
tions of classical antiquity and Judeo-Christianity have reached their climax in Kant, according to 
whom a person should never be regarded merely as a means but as an end in itself. Kant chal-
lenges us to acknowledge all people in their individual personal dignity (see also Schleißheimer 
1989, 4f.). The value of objects is determined by their price; yet whatever is priceless and cannot 
be measured in exchange value [e.g., money] has dignity (see Burkhard). Tibi, himself a traveler 
between cultures, insists uncompromisingly on the accomplishments of the European Enlighten-
ment (specifically on the Kantian reason and its universal ethics (64, 304-5).  
With respect to a realization of Kant's postulate, two main concerns arise, both calling for 
political support and appropriate political willingness: 1) How can the idea of "human dignity" be 
brought to life in the consciousness of humanity as a whole? and 2) How is it possible to mobilize 
institutional protection for this "birthright" (if it is one; for contrary positions see Sen Develop-
ment, 227-48) against various attempts to functionalize a person for diverse purposes? The first is 
mainly a question of upbringing and education and requires a democratic sociopolitical environ-
ment. The second point requires legal protection guaranteed by national and international institu-
tions.  
The Concept of Personhood as a Common Project 
Disillusioned by Foucault and Lyotard, we can no longer look toward a collective history or 
"metanarrative" for providing a basis for our identities. Yet instead of turning toward the past, we 
can design a future identity engaged in the realization of a common social project -- a proposal I 
first introduced in "From Common Ground to Common Project" (1-36). Instead of concentrating on 
the idea of the individual or the universal citizen (which, translated into practice, has repeatedly 
lead to the exclusion of certain groups), this project could find its focal point in the transcultural 
notion of human beings as persons (for an account of the historical exclusion of women under cer-
tain conditions, see Nussbaum Cultivating; Sen Development). As Elise Boulding has so stated: "It 
takes time to become a person. The civic culture, and the public interest, only develop where there 
are human beings with a fully developed sense of individual personhood. ... Reflection is a key to 
the development of personhood. ... We can join the company of persons-in-becoming who are 
working to give civic culture shape, or we can stand on the sidelines. ... The choice is ours" (162-
64).  
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Lately, the concept of personhood has received much critical and literary attention again -- 
in both Western and non-Western cultures (see Bloom 4-6; as well as the contributions by Joseph 
Elder, Robert Thurman, and Paul Valliere in Bloom's volume for a discussion of the significance of 
the individual in Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Russian Orthodox Church). The cur-
rent Western emphasis on the concept of 'personhood' is related to the fact that philosophers 
(e.g., Nussbaum) as well as cultural critics and historians (e.g., Himmelfarb) have moved center 
stage the notion of "virtue" in their discussions of values (e.g., Zagebski; McKinnon). At the same 
time, the term "character," neglected since Modernism, has gained importance in literary criticism, 
psychology, and ethics, especially in connection with an "ethical attitude" and (especially since 
Sartre) the existential personal decision. In a recently published study on the relation between 
"freedom" and "justice," J. Melvin Woody comes to the conclusion that "freedom" is meaningless 
without "integrity of character": "Freedom of choice" and "character" are two sides of the same 
coin (305).  
In contrast to the (arguably Western) notion of human rights, the concept of personhood 
seems less contestable. The accusation of "Eurocentrism" does not apply for the very reason that 
the concept of "personhood" is not an exclusively Western achievement but also manifests itself 
(in similar forms) in other cultures -- although less in the sense of a fully developed metaphysics 
of the person or a theoretically coherent construct than in perpetually recurring efforts to find an-
swers to questions such as: What constitutes a fully developed human being? and How does such 
a person relate toward his/her fellow human beings? From this inter-subjective and interactional 
perspective, the notion of personhood constitutes a highly suitable inter-cultural project for the 
following reasons: 1) Owing to its inherent performative quality, the concept of personhood de-
fines a person's relationship to herself and her fellow human beings, thus regulating her daily so-
cial interactions. In the Middle Ages it was already generally accepted that "one person is not a 
person," which recalls the Confucian jen, according to which the human being as a person is al-
ways represented together with another person. Confucius declares: "By recognizing yourself in 
the Other, you are on your way to humanity" (qtd. in Bloom 122, 128). Peter Frederick Strawson 
similarly insists on an intersubjective aspect inherent in the concept of personhood, defining a per-
son as someone who acknowledges other people as persons and vice versa. The concept of per-
sonhood is thus a reciprocally relational term. Apart from its rich philosophical, teleological, and 
political tradition throughout the European history of ideas, the notion of personhood has remained 
a radically open concept with the potential for further development. In contrast to the codified 
concept of human rights, the notion of personhood -- like the notion of the human being as a cul-
tural being in general -- is an idea-in-progress, a processual and future-oriented concept, incom-
plete and incompletable in its cultural contingencies as well as its constantly changing historical 
definitions. It is this element of incompleteness, in particular, that should enable members of dif-
ferent cultures to make their specific contributions (determined by their respective culture and his-
tory) to the self-conception of human beings.  
The definition of personhood and its political realization thus becomes a genuinely trans-
cultural task, inviting and equally valorizing the contributions of everybody. Without a wide range 
of diverse participants, any understanding of human beingness would have to remain insufficient 
and unbalanced. Moreover, a common project is the crucial prerequisite for ensuring that people 
from various cultures can engage with each other productively and acknowledge each other as 
partners. An intercultural dialogic exchange along these lines may indeed offer numerous opportu-
nities to build bridges across cultural borders, as Bassam Tibi has suggested in his study quoted 
above. Such a dialogue -- less in the sense of a discourse à la Habermas (which aims at promoting 
the better argument) than in the sense of an open conversation -- will call on every participant to 
answer the following questions from his/her special point of view: "What constitutes a human be-
ing?," or, more appropriately, "Who are we?" Instead of demanding a traditional definition of the 
human being, this approach places the practice of social interaction (i.e., the appropriateness of 
interpersonal relationships) at the center of interest. Thus "Who are we?" ultimately becomes even 
less important than the question: "How do we interact with each other?" No doubt the two ques-
tions are closely interrelated. In spite of the great variety of cultural value systems and 
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worldviews, one can still observe considerable correspondences in the negotiation of 
intersubjective relations. Such correspondences mainly refer to central values such as "truth tell-
ing, beneficence, promise keeping, courage, self-control, and justice" (see Harbour 155-170). Ac-
cording to Harbour, "primary moral values" are -- in contrast to culturally specific "secondary" and 
"tertiary" values -- transcultural in nature and are based less on reflection (or reason) than on 
deeper emotional patterns of reaction: "Morality involves evaluations that bear on the essence of 
being human" (Harbour 159; see also Schleißheimer "Der Mensch").  
Not only do interculturally corresponding values turn out to be "primary" values as such; 
they also become "a touchstone for individual and sociocultural behavior" (Harbour 170). A.J.M. 
Milne refers to the following as transcultural moral norms: "respect for human life, pursuit of jus-
tice, fellowship, social responsibility, freedom from arbitrary interference, honorable treatment, 
and civility" (21). In this context Michael Walzer talks of a kind of "minimal morality," which is 
shared by all cultures (Walzer Thick and Thin, 1-19). According to Walzer, people with completely 
different cultural backgrounds can accept each other, help each other and have the opportunity to 
learn from each other on this moral basis (Walzer Objectivity, 8). In the context of such corre-
spondences, a general human feeling, thinking, and judging manifests itself. At least as far as 
"core values" are concerned, something like a universal ethos emerges. Whereas cultural relativ-
ism still applies to "secondary and tertiary values," "core values," according to Harbour, are "ob-
jective principles" (qtd. in Amstutz 10). The acceptance of the highest moral principles as univer-
sally valid norms (as Harbour proposes) almost assumes the quality of a natural law. In view of 
the debates on relativism, this is a highly unconventional form of explanation. Yet the crucial ques-
tion whether the shared features observed by Harbour and others (see Harbour 162-64; for a dis-
cussion of the positions of Milne, Walzer, Klukhohn, Brandt, Lewis, Rokeach, Schwarz, and Bilsky) 
only manifest themselves on such a highly abstract level and disappear in more concrete and reali-
ty-based situations remains at present still unanswered. 
Concluding Thoughts 
To reflect on basic ethical and political concepts from an intercultural perspective, and thus to sug-
gest a transcultural horizon of values for joint political action is a challenge that can only be met 
through interdisciplinary and intercultural cooperations. It is undoubtedly necessary, as Dieter 
Senghaas warns, to transcend one's own limited point of view (215). What would be equally nec-
essary, but cannot be attempted here, is to look back at oneself from a radically external perspec-
tive. Such a bifocal understanding or "compound vision" (Hagenbüchle "Das Subjekt"; 
Hagenbüchle and Raab, xii-xv) constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for a productive intercul-
tural dialogue. Yet the difficulties remain considerable. Dialogue in the sense mentioned above 
constitutes a form of cultural analysis, which in turn implies criticism of both one's own and the 
foreign culture. Finally, it is not easy to alleviate the tensions between divergent modes of obser-
vation and the desire for an all-encompassing frame of reference (Bal 7, 12-14). A look at James 
Clifford's Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century may highlight these prob-
lems. Central ethico-political concepts inevitably reflect a culture's specific history -- however de-
fined. The extent to which non-Western cultures may thus privilege completely different terms re-
quires further investigation. "Understanding" a culture, according to Clifford Geertz, is tantamount 
to reading an alien, faded, incomplete manuscript full of contradictions, questionable amendments, 
and tendentious commentaries (15). This also means, however, that any intercultural dialogue will 
needs consist of different languages and modes of discourse, and that its primary goal will have to 
be the development of a common mode of conversation (see Senghaas 195-221). The inherent 
heterogeneity of the subject positions involved will not permit any facile solutions. Uma Narayan 
has recently attacked Euro-American critics for their tendency to misuse developing countries as a 
mere mirror for critiquing their own culture, thus denying them a voice of their own. At the same 
time, a struggle for dominance would not accomplish anything either.  
Intercultural negotiations demand no less than a new kind of thinking and acting, namely, 
bifocal thinking as social practice (see also Geertz's "bifocal understanding" and "cross- traveling" 
and Hall's "bifocal perspective"). Only by employing a dialectical discourse -- that is, by adopting 
each other's perspectives -- can culturally specific and hence differently perspectivized modes of 
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subjectivity and discourses be reintegrated into an interdiscourse without subjecting the culturally 
competing elements to a new master discourse. Our objective must be "translation" (see Hall's 
notion of the translator as builder of bridges, 6) and certainly not homogenization. Translation, 
however, is apt to produce misunderstandings as the old dictum goes, traduttore, traditore. This is 
all the more true of intercultural translations, in which difficulties in understanding semantic and 
cultural codes add up and multiply (Clifford 6, 36-38, 41-42, 182-85). Moreover, translation is al-
ways interpretation (see Assmann and Assmann 11-28); not without reason is Hermes the god of 
traders and translators; as a go- between, he is also a trickster figure. In other words, mediators 
build bridges while at the same time also creating new obstacles. At best, they help us to familiar-
ize ourselves with and adopt the foreign, without, however, removing its foreign quality; at the 
same time, they also throw into relief our own irreducibly foreign quality in encountering the Oth-
er. Without drawing on Foucault's archeological method, and without a large-scale intercultural 
cooperation such a dialogue cannot be realized.  
The task outlined here is by no means an easy one, but it constitutes an indispensable ba-
sis for living together productively in an intercultural environment -- and it becomes more and 
more urgent every day (see Hahn 247-48). All participants will no doubt encounter surprising and 
productive insights. Yet despite all optimism, Uma Narayan's warning in Dislocating Cultures can-
not be overlooked: "'Figuring out' what isn't 'getting across' seems inevitably a messy, provisional, 
and uncertain business ... I am fairly pessimistic about any quick fixes for these sorts of problems 
of informal 'border- crossings'" (105). And she quotes Himani Bannerji approvingly: "Our struggle 
is for a fundamental change in social relationships ... We are not going shopping in the market of 
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